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Abstract
The Creative Systems Framework (CSF) formalises creativity
as search through a space of concepts. As a formal account
of Margaret Boden’s descriptive hierarchy of creativity, it is
at the basis of multiple studies dealing with diverse aspects of
Computational Creativity (CC) systems. However, the CSF at
present neither formalises action nor action selection during
search, limiting its use in analysing creative processes. We
extend the CSF by explicitly modelling these missing compo-
nents in the search space traversal function. We furthermore
integrate the distinction between a concept and an artefact,
and provide stopping criteria for creative search. Our exten-
sion, the Creative Action Selection Framework (CASF), is
informed by previous studies in CC and draws on concepts
from Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). It allows us to de-
scribe a creative system as an agent selecting actions based on
the value, validity and novelty of concepts and artefacts. The
CASF brings more analytical depth for creative systems that
can be modelled as utilising an action selection procedure.
Introduction
The process by which a creative product or artefact comes
into existence represents one of the four central perspectives
on creativity (Jordanous, 2016). For many Computational
Creativity (CC) systems, this process can be described as on-
going selection and execution of actions through an agent.
An action selection function hereby specifies how the agent
chooses what to do next based on the current situation and
its goals. Examples include a music robot’s selection of
musical gestures (Hoffman and Weinberg, 2010), a game
character’s next move (Guckelsberger, Salge, and Togelius,
2018) and a co-creative agent’s choice of collaboration part-
ners (Hantula and Linkola, 2018). Vice versa, deciding on
how an agent must select its actions to be creative can mark
an important step in the design of a CC system.
Despite the salience of action selection in both the anal-
ysis and design of CC systems, there has been little previ-
ous effort to include action and action selection in a spe-
cialised formal framework for creativity. Existing research
on creative agents either applies heuristic action selection
(e.g. Saunders, 2012; Gabora and Tseng, 2017) or considers
creative action selection in more general frameworks, such
as Reinforcement Learning (RL) modelled on Markov Deci-
sion Processes (MDPs) (Vigorito and Barto, 2008; Colin et
al., 2016). While these approaches offer sufficient solutions
for their individual purposes, they are unfitted for analysing
creative processes at large: the heuristic methods miss a uni-
fied formal foundation for comparison, and generic frame-
works are not sensitive to the specifics of creativity, limiting
the potential for the in-depth analysis of creative processes.
In this paper, we introduce the Creative Action Selection
Framework (CASF), an extension to the Creative Systems
Framework (CSF) (Wiggins, 2006a,b) which can serve as
the formal foundation for describing and analysing action
selection in individual creative agents. It is sufficiently gen-
eral to be applied to different kinds of agents, from reflex-
based to learning agents (cf. Russell and Norvig, 2009).
The CSF is a formal, mathematical account of Bo-
den’s (2004) descriptive hierarchy of creativity. It defines
Boden’s notion of a conceptual space by rules for valid con-
cepts. These are coupled with rules for evaluation applica-
ble to concepts within and out of the conceptual space. In the
centre of the search process is a traversal function; based on
rules for traversal, it allows the system to move from con-
cept to concept. The interplay between these elements can
be used to define characterisations of creative search which,
in turn, can be used in analysing creative systems.
The CSF however misses an account of how this search
is realised through an agent’s actions, and implicitly the se-
lection of these actions. It hence has several limitations with
respect to analysing creative agents: (1) it treats the traver-
sal function as a black box and does not elaborate on how
the agent decides which concept to move to next; (2) it does
not distinguish between the concept, an agent’s inner rep-
resentation of an idea, and the artefact, the concept’s ex-
ternal materialised expression (cf. Grace and Maher, 2015;
Ventura, 2017); finally, (3) the CSF does not put forward
stopping criteria, formalising how the agent reasons that the
given concept and artefact are creative enough.
We extend the CSF to overcome these limitations, draw-
ing on concepts in MDPs (Puterman, 2014). We (1) distin-
guish concepts and artefacts in the CSF. We (2) disassem-
ble the CSF’s traversal function into constituents relevant for
creative agents, allowing for action selection based on the
value, validity and novelty of concepts and artefacts. We (3)
describe possible stopping criteria for the search of concept-
artefact pairs. We reflect on the lack of universal optimality
criteria for creativity, which distinguishes the CASF action
selection further from optimal MDP policies.
Background and Motivation
We first introduce the CSF, identify its limitations towards
analysing creative agents, and introduce MDPs as inspira-
tion to overcoming these limitations in the CASF.
The Creative Systems Framework
The CSF (Wiggins, 2006a,b) formalises Boden’s (2004) de-
scriptive hierarchy of creativity. It hence allows for the ab-
stract discussion of creative systems and the identification of
relevant phenomena within, which particularly concerns the
mechanisms of exploratory and transformational creativity.
The CSF forms the basis for several studies in CC (e.g.
Grace and Maher, 2015; Kantosalo and Toivonen, 2016; Al-
varado and Wiggins, 2018; Linkola and Kantosalo, 2019). In
this paper we focus on the exploratory part of the CSF, but
the elements from our extension can also be used to drive
the transformations of the system’s creative behaviour.
Exploratory creativity consists of discovering novel and
valuable concepts within a known conceptual space (Boden,
2004). The CSF defines it as a septuple
〈U ,L, [[.]], 〈〈., ., .〉〉,R, T , E〉, (1)
where the individual elements of the septuple are described
in Table 1. Below, we only discuss the elements which are
pivotal for the rest of the paper.
The universe U is a multidimensional (possibly infinite-
dimensional) space capable of representing anything. All
possible distinct concepts c ∈ U are distinct points in U .
The empty concept > is also part of the universe, > ∈ U .
A function generator [[.]] interprets a given rule set ex-
pressed in language L and outputs a function which maps
elements of the universe U to real numbers in [0, 1]. It is
used to generate functions that encode the rule setsR and E .
The rule set R ⊂ L defines what kind of concepts are
accepted as valid in terms of belonging to a certain class of
objects such as a mathematical theorems or buildings in a
specific architecture style. R can be used to define the con-
ceptual space, which Boden (2004) characterises as a struc-
tured style of thought, C = {c ∈ U | [[R]](c) ≥ k}, where
k ∈ [0, 1] is a validity threshold.
The rule set E ⊂ L defines the evaluation function for the
system. I.e. the function generated by [[.]] through interpret-
ing E allows to evaluate any concept ∀c ∈ U as [[E ]](c) ∈
[0, 1]. We define the set of valued concepts in the universe
using a value threshold l ∈ [0, 1]: {c ∈ U | [[E ]](c) ≥ l}.
The system’s traversal of the conceptual space rests on a
second function generator 〈〈., ., .〉〉. It takes into account the
traversal rule set T ⊂ L, specifying how the system moves
from concepts (or sequences of concepts) to other concepts
(or sequences). Since traversal can also be informed by
E and R, the generator interprets all three rule sets, T , R
and E into a function which maps a sequence of input con-
cepts, cin, into a sequence of output concepts, cout:
cout = 〈〈T ,R, E〉〉(cin). (2)
The CSF has been developed to, amongst others, describe
and analyse the exploratory capabilities of creative systems.
However, lacking the notion of actions, the CSF omits the
U the universe containing all possible concepts
L a language in which to express concepts and
rules, in a broad sense of the universe, L ⊂ U
[[.]] a function generator which maps a subset of
L to a function which associates elements of
U with a real number in [0, 1].
〈〈., ., .〉〉 a function generator mapping three subsets of
L to a function that generates a new sequence
of concepts of U from an existing one.
R ⊂ L rules defining valid concepts
T ⊂ L rules defining traversal in the concept space
E ⊂ L rules defining evaluation of concepts
Table 1: Description of the elements in the CSF
decisions the system makes as the search unfolds. As such,
it fails to describe creative agents and their behaviour in
sufficient detail. Below, we discuss these limitations and
draw on concepts from MDPs to address them.
Creative Agents and the CSF
We shape our concept of creative agents by combining Rus-
sel and Norvig’s (2009) concept of intelligent agents with
the ‘standard definition of creativity’ (Runco and Jaeger,
2012). We consider a creative agent to be utility-based with
the goal to produce creative, i.e. novel and valuable, con-
cepts and artefacts. The latter distinction stems from sep-
arating an agent and its environment. A concept describes
an agents’ inner representation of ideas. An artefact in con-
trast is a materialisation of a concept as part of the agent’s
environment, which the agent may only have partial access
to and control of1. The same concept can be expressed as
different artefacts using diverse skills or means: the concept
of a flying horse can be expressed as a poem or as a painting,
and in both domains there are a plethora of ways to do so2.
During a creative agent’s operation, the system’s over-
all state can be conceived as a tuple of two states: one for
the concept and one for the artefact, both of which can be
“empty” at any given time. We denote this as the agent’s po-
sition. To produce concepts and artefacts, the agent performs
actions that affect the state of its concept, the artefact’s, or
both. The search for concepts happens in the concept state
space, whereas artefacts are manipulated in the artefact state
space3. The effectiveness of actions to induce change de-
pends on the dynamics of these spaces.
We define the agent’s overall goal as finding a position
where both the present concept and the artefact are assessed
favourably, and the artefact is a good fit for the concept, i.e.
1This environment can be arbitrarily complex. Here, we only
consider the part constituting the agent’s artefact.
2Our concept-artefact distinction is informed by Grace and Ma-
her (2015) and Ventura’s (2017) genotype-phenotype distinction.
3We acknowledge that this distinction of an internal conceptual
space and an external environment with artefacts is a simplifica-
tion as from a monist position (Jaworski, 2011), there is no differ-
ence between these domains in terms of substance. Moreover, the
existence of a clear boundary separating an agent and its external
environment is disputed, challenging the very concept of agency.
it expresses the concept well. Crucially, the agent may first
thrive to find a prominent concept and then express it as
an artefact. Alternatively, it may seek an artefact which is
then associated with a concept, as in the case of Duchamp’s
“ready-mades” where an existing artefact is placed in a new
context in which it can be conceived in a fundamentally dif-
ferent way. Moreover, the agent may alternate between con-
cept and artefact exploration, incorporating insights from
perceiving the unfinished artefact along the way.
In existing CC systems, the exploration of potential con-
cepts and artefacts is often interrupted externally by the user
or designer as soon as they are satisfied by the outcome. We
however model a creative agent’s own perspective on its con-
cept and artefacts. Hence, we must formalise how the agent
itself decides that it should stop its creative process.
We identify several shortcomings of the CSF towards de-
scribing creative agents as introduced above:
1. No actions: The agent’s actions are obscured in the traver-
sal function and the CSF lacks a formal account of the
agent’s action selection in the creative process.
2. No concept-artefact separation: The CSF does not dis-
tinguish between concepts and artefacts and hence cannot
explicate how their possible relationships can impact the
agent’s creative process.
3. No stopping criteria: The CSF offers little explanation of
when a creative agent should “stop” its exploration, e.g.,
to start anew or to output its current concept-artefact pair.
We address these limitations by drawing inspiration from
the framework of Markov Decision Processes.
Markov Decision Processes
A Markov Decision Process (MDP) (Bellman, 1957) de-
scribes a sequential decision-making problem. It models the
possible interaction between an arbitrary agent and its envi-
ronment over time, where the environment is distinguished
from the agent by everything that they cannot change arbi-
trarily (Sutton and Barto, 2018, p. 50). At each point of
the interaction, the agent can receive a reward from the en-
vironment. The problem consists of finding a policy, i.e. a
decision-making rule, which maximises cumulative future
reward from an initial state onward (Puterman, 2014, p. 2).
A (infinite horizon) MDP is a quadruple 〈S,A, p, ρ〉 (Put-
erman, 2014, pp. 1-2). The environment state at time-step
t≥0 is denoted as st∈S. An agent’s action at∈A can in-
fluence the future state of the environment st+1 determined
by environment dynamics p : S×A×S→[0, 1] given as
a conditional probability distribution p(st+1|st, at), where
the actions available to an agent can depend on the cur-
rent environment state. The actions produce an immedi-
ate reward signal rt+1∈R determined by the reward func-
tion ρ : S×A×S→R, given by ρ(st+1, at, st)=rt+1. The
Markov assumption implies that st must encode all rele-
vant information about the past agent-environment interac-
tion that matters for the future dynamics.
All previous elements formalise the decision-making
problem, but do not provide a solution. Specifying the prob-
ability of the agent selecting a specific action in a specific
state π(a|s), a policy is an attempt to solve the problem spec-
ified by a MDP. A solution to the problem is an optimal pol-
icy π∗ that maximises cumulative future reward. Crucially,
there can be several optimal policies.
MDPs and methods to (approximately) solve them,
e.g. RL, have been previously discussed and utilised in
creative contexts (e.g. Hoffman and Weinberg, 2010; Han-
tula and Linkola, 2018). Vigorito and Barto (2008) model
creativity as a blind variation-and-selection process, argu-
ing that creative behaviour may be acquired by hierarchical
RL as means to reduce the complexity of creative search.
Colin et al. (2016) present one possible mapping of Ritchie’s
(2012) “simplified version” of the CSF to hierarchical RL
where the MDP policies are CSF’s concepts and their eval-
uation in the CSF is likened to the discounted return of the
policy. Based on this mapping, they argue that hierarchi-
cal RL realises creative behaviour in the form of exploratory
and transformational creativity.
We next move beyond existing work by proposing an ex-
tension to the CSF which accounts for actions and action
selection by adopting the notions of states, actions and en-
vironment dynamics from MDPs. We also elaborate on the
use of these notions to fit the specifics of creative agents, in
particular the distinction between concepts and artefacts.
Bringing Actions to the CSF
We now introduce the Creative Action Selection Framework
(CASF) as extension to the CSF to leverage its power for the
description of creative agents. We consider a single creative
agent with a closed loop creative process. That is, the agent
moves in the search space using solely its own actions and
reasoning. The agent’s actions can change the states of the
concept and artefact spaces, which the agent can then ob-
serve and assess. We thus do not explicitly consider any co-
creative and interactive agents which rely on external feed-
back or communication with other agents. However, most
of our formulation also applies to these cases.
Our main contribution in this section is the deconstruc-
tion of the agent’s traversal function 〈〈T ,R, E〉〉. Before we
can address this however, we must add detail to some of the
CSF’s other elements: we introduce the concept of actions
into the traversal rules T , and make time and the concept-
artefact distinction explicit in the framework.
Universe U: We distinguish two subsets from the uni-
verse: Uω , which encompasses concepts, and Uα, which
contains artefacts. Uω and Uα comprise the possible states
of concept and artefact search, respectively. The empty state
> is a member of both subsets.
Input and output sequences cin and cout: As we view a
creative agent in a combination position of a concept and an
artefact, we consider each element in the input and output
sequences cin and cout as a position tuple φ = (ω, α), where
ω ∈ Uω and α ∈ Uα. Thus, for a single element sequence,
an agent’s traversal (Equation 2) may be denoted by
φout = 〈〈T ,R, E〉〉(φin). (3)
In the rest of this paper, we mostly consider such singular
input and output positions. However, as U can represent
anything, it can also comprise sequences of such positions.
Our formalisation works mostly for both cases.
Time t ≥ 0: Time is implicitly present in the original
CSF’s ordering of input and output sequences. We make it
explicit in an agent’s closed loop creative process by denot-
ing φin = φt and φout = φt+1. That is, we assume that time
progresses with traversal from t to t+ 1, and that the output
of the last time step’s traversal function is fed as an input to
the traversal function in the next time step.
Value, validity and novelty: Novelty is not explicitly
considered in the original CSF – what the evaluation rules
E entail is left vague. To make novelty explicit, we denote
the rules for novelty by EN 4, and rules for evaluation by EE .
Furthermore, we modify both the interpreted validity and
evaluation function ([[R]] and [[EE ]]) to accept a position as
input and address novelty by adding an interpreted novelty
function [[EN ]] which also operates on a position. We assume
that these functions return a triplet of real values represent-
ing the assessment of the input concept, the artefact and their
combination. This results in the following functions:
evaluate(φ) = [[EE ]](φ) = (eω, eα, eωα) (4)
validate(φ) = [[R]](φ) = (vω, vα, vωα), and (5)
novelty(φ) = [[EN ]](φ) = (nω, nα, nωα), (6)
where the subscript ω denotes assessment for the concept,
the subscript α assessment for the artefact, and the subscript
ωα assessment for the combination5.
The combination assessments describe if the artefact ex-
presses the concept properly (validity) and how elegant the
expression is (evaluation). For example, for the concept of
freedom, valid artefacts could portray unlocked shackles or
a bird. However, if the bird happened to be a penguin, the
concept might not be as elegantly expressed as using a more
stereotypical bird in a proper context.
For novelty, as φ is a single position for which novelty is
computed, we assume that the function incorporates the se-
lected input positions (such as those that the agent chooses
to output) into a persistent, internal model of novelty for suc-
cessive calls. That is, the novelty is computed with respect to
the history of the agent. Novelty of the combination serves
here a similar purpose as the combination assessments in va-
lidity and evaluation functions: it may be used to assess how
new the concept-artefact pair is.
Traversal rules T : Traversal rules govern how the sys-
tem explores the search space. As we model the agent’s ex-
ploration as an action selection process inspired by MDPs,
we distinguish the following subsets in T :
TA (or simply A): the actions available to the agent;
Tφ: the agent’s model of the search space (how the concept
and artefact spaces react to the agent’s actions); and
Tπ: the policy specifying the habit to move in both spaces.
4Specific traversal rules can foster novelty, but it is ultimately
the result of evaluation. In contrast to Grace and Maher (2015), we
hence only consider it in evaluation and not in the traversal rules.
5Further distinctions are possible, e.g. the evaluation of the arte-
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Figure 1: Closed loop traversal: an agent (1) observes its po-
sition, (2) selects the next action and (3) executes it, which
may influence the position. Different action selection mech-
anisms use some or all of the following components in vary-
ing order: the assessment of the present position, the filter-
ing of actions into a relevant subset, the prediction of action
outcomes, and the choosing of an action.
The actions a ∈ A form the nucleus of action selection
and of our deconstruction of the traversal function. An ac-
tion may alter the agent’s place in the concept space, in
the artefact space, or in both. By construction, CASF also
includes two special action types present in creative pro-
cesses and previously discriminated in CC, translation and
re-perception (Grace and Maher, 2015; Ventura, 2017). The
agent is completely free to execute which action it chooses,
but the actions available to the agent may differ from posi-
tion to position.
Deconstructing the Traversal Function
Next, we go through a single iteration of the agent’s
closed loop traversal encompassed in the traversal function
〈〈T ,R, E〉〉, and illustrated in Figure 1. The agent initially
observes its current position, and eventually executes the
next action. The action selection can be implemented via
different mechanisms; each uses some or all of the follow-
ing components, potentially in different order: the agent as-
sessing the position’s value, validity and novelty, filtering its
own action possibilities, predicting their possible outcomes,
and choosing the next action to take. Below, we address
these six components individually and separate them into
their own functions. This provides us with conceptual clar-
ity, and supports the CASF’s use in the description and anal-
ysis of diverse creative agent types, including hard-coded
reflex-based agents and those capable of learning from ex-
perience to adapt action selection. We acknowledge that this
separation does not account for all atomic elements in cre-
ative action selection – e.g. predicting could be further di-
vided into predicting the next positions and assessing them.
Observe (position): The agent needs to observe its posi-
tion at time t to gather information about where it is in the
concept and artefact spaces. Formally,
φobs := observe(φt), (7)
where φt is the agent’s actual position at time t and φobs =
(ωt, αt), ωt ∈ Uω and αt ∈ Uα, denotes its observation
by the agent. Generally, this observation is imperfect, i.e.
φt 6= φobs; the agent may not have a full view of the uni-
verse, and observe some of the dimensions of U (relevant
for either concepts or artefacts or both) incorrectly or not
at all. In the rest of this section, we typically assume that
φobs is a single position. However, whenever we deal with
mechanisms which include the agent’s history, we assume
that φobs contains the agent’s (recent) observed position his-
tory or the agent has other means to retrieve it from data
structures which are not explicitly specified.
Assess (position): The agent may assess its observed po-
sition. We denote this assessment by







where the three functions on the right are defined in Equa-
tions 4-6. These assessments are essential to direct the
agent’s further reasoning process. For example, if all as-
sessments are favourable, the agent may choose to output
the concept-artefact pair; if only the concept is assessed
favourably, the agent may only develop the artefact further.
Filter (actions): The agent may filter which actions are
appropriate given its current position and the assessments:
Aappr := filter(φobs,∆, TA), (9)
whereAappr ⊂ TA is the set of actions the agent finds appro-
priate with respect to its goal(s), and ∆ is either the returned
assessments, δ, or (parts of) the assess-function itself.
The filtering step adheres to the “hard traversal rules” of
the system which can not be broken in any circumstance,
but it may also be based on the agent’s (recent) history and
goals. Typical cases of the former are the hard-coded re-
strictions for the system to stay in the conceptual space, e.g.,
by restricting the percentage of the canvas that can be red.
The latter part can serve similar purposes as “focus” or “at-
tention” in animals. If the agent’s current goal e.g. is to
compose a painting using only triangles, then the appropri-
ate actions in the artefact space may deal only with triangles.
Predict (actions): The agent may inform its next action
by predicting the consequences of available, potentially fil-
tered actions. This may involve a (learned) model of ac-
tion outcomes, or some fixed heuristics. Below, we as-
sume the former case, where the agent uses its model of
the exploration dynamics, Tφ, an adaptation of the envi-
ronment dynamics from MDPs. Formally, these dynamics
Tφ : Uω×Uα×A×Uω×Uα→[0, 1] are given by a conditional
probability distribution Tφ(ωt+1, αt+1|ωt, αt, at). The pre-
dict function for an arbitrary action is given by
(φ̂t+1, êt+1, v̂t+1, n̂t+1):=predict(φobs, a,R, E , Tφ), (10)
where φ̂t+1, êt+1, v̂t+1, and n̂t+1 are the predicted observed
position in the next time step caused by the action and
its predicted value, validity and novelty triplets, respec-
tively. In general, the output6 can also be a sequence of
6The predict-function may also return confidences for the
predictions, which are argued to be required for assessing sur-
prise (Grace and Maher, 2015) of the action outcomes.
(φ̂t+1, êt+1, v̂t+1, n̂t+1, p̂) tuples, where p̂ is the predicted
probability for that outcome. We hat these variables to indi-
cate that they represent potential rather than actual states.
Where the filter-function restricted the appropriate action
set with respect to the agent’s history and goals, the predict-
function envisions likely outcomes of the actions and ap-
proximates their assessments. The predictions may be in-
accurate and incomplete as the agent’s model of the explo-
ration dynamics may only encode some of the relevant con-
cept and artefact dimensions well. Strong predictive capa-
bilities allow the agent to assess an action more thoroughly
by exploring its consequences further into the future. Infor-
mally, an agent employing a predictive model “imagines”
possible concepts and artefacts before they are realised, and
can use that imagination to drive its creative process.
Apt prediction capabilities are essential when execut-
ing an action (see below) is resource demanding or non-
reversible. For example, a painting robot may take a consid-
erable time in executing a set of instructions to paint the next
patch and it costs money to buy the paint needed. Moreover,
in safety critical domains, the actions may cause dangerous
situations and ultimately harm humans or other actors.
Choose (action): The last part of the action selection is
naturally about choosing the next action to take. This may
be entirely random, but can also be informed by the cur-
rent position’s assessment and by predictions of potentially
filtered actions. Moreover, it could take into account Tπ ,
(learned) heuristics on how to proceed from this (or similar)
observations onwards as adaptation of the MDP policy7. As
a creative agent is constantly in a combination of two states,
we have Tπ : Uω×Uα×A→[0, 1], which is given as a condi-
tional probability distribution Tπ(at|ωt, αt)8.
The choose-function incorporates these information
sources into a mapping to a single chosen action. Formally,
a := choose(φobs,∆,Dpreds, Tπ), (11)
where ∆ denotes either the returned assessments, δ, or (parts
of) the assess-function itself, and Dpreds is a potential map-
ping from actions to their predictions obtained using the
predict-function. If the agent can only filter, the mapping
contains only the keys for each a ∈ Aappr.
Creative agents can implement the choose-function in dif-
ferent ways. It may use well known methods, e.g. a soft-
max (Sutton and Barto, 2018, p. 322) over action assess-
ments, or it can incorporate precoded heuristics. Moreover,
the function may depend on the recent history of the agent,
e.g., to determine the priority of novelty, value and validity,
or to compare the assessments of the current position and the
predicted outcomes with past assessments.
Execute (action): Executing the chosen action is the
agent’s means to potentially impact its position. Formally,
φt+1 := execute(a), (12)
where φt+1 is the objective position at the next time step.
This is the output of the traversal function.
7Considering the policy as argument to choose allows us to con-
sider off-policy traversal and policy updates in the CASF.
8This formalisation also accounts for deterministic policies by
modelling them as Dirac delta distributions.
Algorithm 1 Example of model-free action selection in
computing the traversal function φt+1 = 〈〈T ,R, E〉〉(φt).
φobs ← observe(φt)
δ ← assess(φobs,R, E)
store (at−1, δ) in dictionary Dδ
at ← choose(., .,Dδ, .)
φt+1 ← execute(at)
Algorithm 2 Example of model-based action-selection in
computing the traversal function φt+1 = 〈〈T ,R, E〉〉(φt).
φobs ← observe(φt)
Aappr ← filter(φobs, ., TA)
foreach a ∈ Aappr do
(φ̂t+1, êt+1, v̂t+1, n̂t+1)←predict(φobs, a,R, E , Tφ)
store (φ̂t+1, êt+1, v̂t+1, n̂t+1) in dictionary Dpreds
end
at ← choose(φobs, .,Dpreds, Tπ)
φt+1 ← execute(at)
The next traversal cycle starts with the agent observing its
potentially new position as basis for action selection and to
verify whether the previous action has resulted in a desir-
able or predicted outcome. This is not certain: the agent’s
predictions may be defective, the dynamics of the performed
action may be noisy, e.g. when splattering paint, or the exe-
cution may add imperfections to the planned action, e.g. by
an unintentional rotation of a loose joint.
There exist many means to combine the above building
blocks into a specific action selection function: many cre-
ative agents do not use all elements, or their functionality
overlaps in the specific implementation. To illustrate the
spectrum of possible approaches and support the applica-
bility of the CASF across different agent types, we pro-
vide pseudocode for two action selection mechanisms in the
traversal function. In the model-free approach in Algorithm
1, the agent chooses the next action to perform based on a
past record of action-assessment tuples. A concrete exam-
ple of this approach is Q-learning (Sutton and Barto, 2018,
p. 131 ff.). In the model-based approach in Algorithm 2 in
contrast, the agent predicts the consequences of each action
in a set of previously filtered, appropriate actions. It then
leverages these future action assessments to choose the next
action to execute. An example for this is Monte Carlo Tree
Search (Sutton and Barto, 2018, p. 185 ff.).
Stopping Exploration
By repeatedly invoking its traversal function based on the
previous cycle’s output, the agent moves in the concept and
artefact space. Crucially, the original CSF does not spec-
ify any stopping criteria for exploratory creativity to explain
how the agent reasons that it has arrived at a particularly apt
concept-artefact pair, which it could, for example, then show
to others. Below, we describe a few potential stopping crite-
ria, partly informed by the additional elements in the CASF:
Thresholds: A simple way for the agent to decide that
the given concept-artefact pair is creative enough is that all
the assessments are above some absolute thresholds given to
the agent during its initialisation. This relates to Wiggins’s
(2006a) usage of a filtering thresholds for the conceptual
space and the set of valued artefacts. Dynamic thresholds
work in a similar manner, but instead of the thresholds being
fixed, the agent may alter them based on its own history and
experience on assessing concepts, artefacts and their combi-
nations. This gives the agent more room e.g. to determine
acceptable assessments in a certain area of the search space.
Predictions: Given a predictive model, the agent may
approximate if it could, by means of its acting, cause a
concept-artefact pair in the near future that is assessed more
favourably than the current one. If the likelihood for this is
high, then the agent may reason that it should not stop in
the current position. If the likelihood for generating a better
position is low however, the agent may either output the po-
sition (if its overall assessment is favourable) or start anew
(if the current position is below average). Predictive reason-
ing and stopping is especially important in creative domains
where actions can hardly be reversed, e.g. when painting on
a physical canvas, or in music and dance improvisation.
Resource restrictions: The agent may stop exploration
based on the consumption of a specific, tracked resource.
For instance, it may have a time budget, and stop as soon as
additional exploration is not predicted to yield any improve-
ments in assessing the current concept-artefact pair.
Other criteria: Naturally, there are a multitude of other
possible stopping criteria for the agent based on its design
and purpose. Moreover, the criteria above may be combined.
Action Selection in Analysis
Next, we consider how the CASF may be applied in describ-
ing and analysing creative agents. Due to the scope of the
paper, we refrain from most mathematical formulations and
merely list dimensions which may provide a useful starting
point for an in-depth analysis of an agent’s creative process.
We first distinguish dimensions that enable, amongst oth-
ers, the coarse analysis of a creative agent’s action capabil-
ities: movement in the position space (Do the actions cover
movement in both the concept and the artefact space?), ac-
tion possibilities (How many actions are available to the
agent in any given situation? How many of these result in
distinct outcomes?), action granularity (How fine-grained
are the agent’s potential movements in the concept and arte-
fact spaces?), execution control (Does executing an action in
a certain position map to one or to multiple outcomes?), ac-
tion scope (Does the agent have actions that are fundamen-
tally different, e.g. actions for producing both music and
visual art?), and action learning (Is the agent able to learn
new or more complex actions during its creative process?).
The dimensions above may serve as the basis of analysing
a creative agent. However, they neither provide sufficient
detail on the characteristics of the action selection procedure
inside the traversal function, nor do they govern the agent’s
overall process of moving in the position space (i.e. action-
position sequences) while searching for apt concept-artefact
pairs. We address (parts of) both of these cases below.
Filtering characteristics: Does the set of appropriate ac-
tions change between positions? How strict is the agent’s
filtering? Too strict filtering may restrict creativity, while
lenient filtering may hinder performance. Controlled os-
cillation between lenient and strict filtering may hint that
the agent’s creative process can be characterised with cy-
cles of divergence and convergence.
Prediction abilities: Is the agent able to predict outcomes
of its actions? How well the agent’s prediction matches
the outcome of the executed action? How reliable are the
predicted value, validity and novelty? Prediction ability
is important for the agent to work towards its goals, while
mistakes in predictions may give arise to serendipity.
Flexibility of the process: Does the system’s operation re-
sult in similar action sequences or does the action
sequences differ between producing multiple concept-
artefact pairs for output. Is the process largely the same no
matter which concept and/or artefact is produced? Over-
all flexibility of the process can be seen as desirable, but
it should be coupled with the reliability of the process.
Reliability of the process: How reliably the creative agent
produces apt concept-artefact pairs? How well the agent
is able to exploit promising subspaces of the whole po-
sition space? This dimension analyses the agent’s align-
ment towards its overall goal. It should be used in con-
junction with the other dimensions to ensure that the agent
does not simply wander around.
Lastly, we reflect on the deterrent modes of creativity
which deal with the system’s overall deficiencies to reach
apt concepts (Wiggins, 2006a). With the CASF, we can de-
scribe these modes from the agent’s perspective. An agent
which only momentarily visits any of these deterrent modes
can be argued to be aligned towards its goal of producing apt
concept-artefact pairs. However, some exploration in these
modes may be needed in order for the agent to reach apt
positions which would not be discovered otherwise.
In order for the original mode descriptions to be applica-
ble for creative agents, we need to modify them (1) to take
time into account and (2) to allow concept-artefact pairs.
We use generative uninspiration (Wiggins, 2006a) as an ex-
ample, but similar modifications can be done to all of the
modes. For simplicity, we only cover the case of evaluat-
ing the concept-artefact combination, but any composition
of concept and artefact assessments could be considered.
Below, we use time leniency, denoted by m, to mark the
agent’s own understanding of what is an acceptable number
of time steps to continuously spend in a deterrent mode.
Definition. Generative Uninspiration Let φt be an agent’s
observation of its position in the time step t and let
[[EE ]](φt) = (etω, etα, etωα) be the agent’s evaluations for its
observed position in the time step t. An agent with time le-
niency m notices itself exhibiting generative uninspiration
(for concept-artefact pairs) on time step k ≥ t + m, if
∀eωα ∈ (etωα, . . . , ekωα) : eωα < ε, where ε is the agent’s
threshold for valuable concept-artefact combinations.
Discussion
We have defined a creative agent’s main goal as the pro-
duction of creative, i.e. novel and valuable, concept-artefact
pairs. We have moreover formalised the respective process
as ongoing selection and execution of actions based on the
assessment of these pairs, resulting in a sequence of action-
position tuples. The CASF hence provides a deeper account
of the product and process perspective on creativity (Jor-
danous, 2016) than the original CSF, in that it characterises
the desired properties of creative products, and uses them
to ground the creative process in action-selection. Our ex-
tension accounts for the person perspective by considering
the extent of the agent’s creative capabilities in a similar but
more detailed manner as the original CSF’s description of
deterrent modes of creativity. For instance, the CASF al-
lows us to ask if the agent has the ability to predict the con-
sequences of its actions.
The concept-artefact distinction in the CASF is included
for completeness, as it is present in theories of human
creative processes and has been discriminated before in
CC (Grace and Maher, 2015; Ventura, 2017). However, not
all agents are capable of using both state spaces. In these
cases, the framework can be reduced to deal only with con-
cepts or artefacts.
Creative processes can also be considered through the
FACE model (Colton, Charnley, and Pease, 2011), which
aims to describe progress in the development of a creative
system. The FACE model distinguishes between concepts
(a piece of code, e.g. a function) and expressions generated
using these concepts. This bears some similarity to concepts
in the CASF and their expressions as artefacts. However,
the FACE model handles the expression generation as a sin-
gle act (similar to Ventura, 2017), whereas in the CASF an
artefact may be generated using multiple actions. Moreover,
a CASF agent may search for an apt concept for a fixed arte-
fact, a case that is not accounted for in the FACE model.
In the CASF, the observe-function is treated as a black
box. However, certain theories of creative processes, such as
engagement-reflection (Sharples, 1996), treat the perception
of an artefact as an action in its own right. While the CASF
encompasses re-perception actions that describe an artefact
as a concept, it does not explicate all the different types of
perceiving actions, some of which may involve assessing the
artefact in a particular way. We believe that the framework
would benefit from making them explicit.
Surprise is a prominent subjective assessment which is
sometimes considered a defining characteristic of creativ-
ity (Boden, 2004), and which may influence action-selection
and hence the direction of a creative process. We have not
considered surprise in this paper, but it could be included
into the CASF by e.g. adopting Grace and Maher’s (2015)
proposal: the predict-function can be modified to return con-
fidence values for the predictions and the prediction accu-
racy can then be determined in the next time step. If the
prediction confidence was high and the observed position or
an assessment in the next time step deviates sufficiently from
the prediction, the agent may quantify this as surprise.
Conclusions
We have extended the CSF to distinguish concepts and arte-
facts and to include action selection in its traversal function.
The resulting Creative Action Selection Framework (CASF)
is the first formal framework oriented towards the analysis
of creative agents. It provides formal tools to analyse a cre-
ative agent’s on-going process of producing concepts and
artefacts by dividing the agent’s traversal of the search space
into six conceptually separate building blocks which may
each be further specified and analysed. By formalising the
agent’s action and position sequences and their alignment
with their goals, the CASF moreover also affords a more
high-level analysis of the resulting behaviour.
One goal for future work is to detail the formalism fur-
ther so that the components in an agent’s action selection
can be considered in terms of simpler, shared atomic fac-
tors. This would highlight their commonalities and support
the analysis and comparison of creative systems. By intro-
ducing action-selection to the CSF, the CASF allows us to
compare a dedicated framework for the analysis of creative
agents to more general decision-making frameworks in AI.
Another goal for future work is to investigate such possible
mappings and consequently evaluating the specific notions
of creativity developed by Boden (2004) and formalised by
Wiggins (2006a,b) in a wider AI context.
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